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The software engineering literature abounds with accounts of “failed” software projects, i.e., 
projects that came in far over schedule, and/or far over budget, or were cancelled, before 
completion, with the loss of significant investment. An oft-mentioned whose cause has been the 
subject of little or no serious study is that of shelfware, i.e., successfully completed software that 
is never adopted. The work described here is, to our knowledge, the first empirical study of the 
causes of shelfware, a study that has already resulted in the reduction of shelfware in one of the 
organizations studied. Our purpose is to identify and understand those factors that can lead to 
the non-adoption of successfully completed software, with the idea of monitoring those factors 
during the software development process, in order to maximize the probability of adoption – or 
to kill the project if adoption is judged to be unlikely. 
 




The software engineering literature abounds with accounts of “failed” software projects, i.e., 
projects that came in far over schedule, and/or far over budget, or were cancelled, before 
completion, with the loss of significant investment [Standish 2004] . There are myriad papers on 
cost and schedule estimation [Boehm et al 2000], on various approaches to development process, 
from agile [Beck 2004, Crispin 2002, Jeffries 2000], to planned (heavy weight) [Paulk 1995], and 
on tailoring process to the right point, on the continuum between agile and planned 
[Boehm,Turner 2004] – all aimed at bringing in software development projects within budget 
and schedule, and with all functional and non-functional requirements met. But, on-time, within-
budget, top-quality software is far from “successful” software. 
 
An oft-mentioned phenomenon, whose cause has been the subject of little or no serious study is 
that of shelfware, i.e., successfully completed software that is never adopted. The term 
“shelfware” applies to both shrink-wrapped software that is bought/licensed but never used and 
custom software, intended for a specialized application – either developed from scratch or 
customized COTS. The work described here is, to our knowledge, the first empirical study of the 
causes of shelfware, a study that has already resulted in the drastic reduction of shelfware in one 
of the organizations studied. In what follows, we will restrict our attention to custom software. 
Our purpose is to identify and understand those factors that can lead to the non-adoption of 
successfully completed software, with the idea of monitoring those factors during the software 
development process, in order to maximize the probability of adoption – or to kill the project if 
adoption is judged to be unlikely. 
 
580 
Questions of interest include: 
-What are the factors that contribute to the non-adoption of custom-developed 
software when both the developers and the client are satisfied with it? 
-Is there a set of factors whose satisfaction is necessary for adoption? 
-Is there a set of factors whose satisfaction is sufficient for adoption? 
-Is adoption predicated upon some weighted sum of satisfaction levels’ rising above a 
threshold value? 
-How can awareness, during software development, of identified factors, and of their 
relative influences on (non)adoption increase the probability of adoption – or of 
early (justified) project termination? 
 
2. Initial (University) Study 
Our initial study of the shelfware issue resulted from frustration with the low rate of adoption of 
software developed by students in USC’s CS577, a two-semester graduate course in Software 
Engineering. CS577 students, many of whom have industry experience, spend a full academic 
year, working in groups of five, developing (real) e-service applications for (real) faculty and 
staff clients. (Only projects that are judged to have high probabilities of ultimate success are 
allowed to proceed past the first semester.) For numerous examples see [Boem et al 1999].  
 
By 1997, a few years after the course was first offered, it was noted that, despite the fact that 
almost all teams whose projects persisted beyond the end of the first semester were producing 
first-rate software – first-rate in the eyes of both client and developer – a less-than-desirable 
fraction of that software ended up being put into regular use. The immediate issue of interest was 
finding the factors that were causing the problem – and either eliminating or reducing them – 
because of the fear that low adoption rates would discourage faculty and staff from participating 
as clients in future offerings of the course. Of equal interest was the likelihood that answers to 
course-related adoption questions would lead to answers to the issue of shelfware in industry. 
 
The first step in investigating the problem was to interview clients of completed projects. The 
result of these interviews was the identification of nine (non)adoption-related factors, the first 
five of which relate to the client: 
1.Domain-Knowledgeable client: “Domain knowledge” refers to knowledge of the 
client organization and of those business processes relevant to the software product. 
The issues over which the client must have command in order to be deemed domain 
knowledgeable include:  
-the rationale for the product 
-the goals of the product 
-the business processes that the product encompasses 
-the impact of the product on the organization, including its business 
processes 
-the conditions necessary for the product to provide value to the 
organization 
2.Representative client: A client is deemed representative if s/he 
-has been granted the right to represent the organization in dealing with 
the developers 
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-has the authority to mandate the use of the software product if s/he deems 
it to be acceptable.  
3.Focused client: A client is deemed to be focused if  
-s/he pursues a well-defined set of consistent organizational objectives for 
the software under development 
-those objectives are relatively stable over the software’s development 
cycle 
4.Collaborative client: A client is deemed collaborative if s/he is willing and able to 
work with the developers and/or vendors, to maintain a shared vision of the product  
5.O&M-sensitive client: A client is deemed O&M-sensitive if s/he is willing and able 
(empowered), at the appropriate point(s) within the software product’s life cycle, to 
allocate resources necessary for operation and maintenance of the product. Such 
resources may include: salaries for (hardware and software) maintenance staff, for 
database administrators, and for system administrators; and COTS licensing fees. 
 
In addition to the four client-related factors, the following four environment-related factors were 
identified: 
6.Stable environment: For the purposes of this discussion, the environment includes 
the organization’s micro-environment and its macro-environment.  
-The microenvironment includes:  





-various publics, where a “public” is any group that has an actual or 
potential interest in, or impact on, an organization’s ability to 
achieve its objectives. For example, financial publics are banks, 
investment houses, and stockholders that can influence the 
organization’s ability to obtain funds, and, thereby, affect the IT 
budget.  







7.(pre-deployment) Site preparation, for example: timely installation and setup 
of appropriate computer hardware, of security devices, and of climate 
control equipment if necessary; and allocation of staff for adequate hours of 
operation. 
8.(pre-deployment) Software preparation, for example: installation of the 
appropriate operating system and of any needed COTS products 
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9.(pre-deployment) Staff preparation, for example: training, in operation and 
maintenance, of users, of system administrators, and of database 
administrators  
 
Starting in academic year 1997-1998, USC CS577 students were instructed in the meanings of 
the factors listed above, and were given scorecards to use in assessing them for their projects. 
The notation used in the scorecards, and repeated below in Table 1, is as follows: 
- “+”: the factor was adequately addressed 
- “(+)”: the factor was partially addressed 
- “-”: the factor was inadequately addressed 
 
Table 1, below, shows the data thru the end of academic year 2000-2003. 
 
Client Characteristics Transition 
Preparation 





























EDGAR Business Data + + - + + + - - + + - 
Medieval Manuscripts + - - + + + - - + + - 
Technical Reports + + - + + + - - - + - 
Latin American 
Pamphlets 
+ + - + + + - - + + - 
Cinema-TV + + + + + + + (+) - + (+) 
Image Archives - - - + - + - - + - - 
1997-1998 
S-Charts + + + + + + (+) + (+) + (+) 
Global Express + + + + + + - + - + - 
Hancock Virtual 
Museum 
+ + (+) + + + + + - + - 
Serial Control Records + + + + + + + + (+) + (+) 
B-School Working 
Papers 
+ + + + + + + + + + + 
1998-1999 
Data Mining + + + + + + + + (+) + + 
Dissertations + + + + + + + (+) + + (+) 
Hispanic Archive + + + + + + + + - + - 




+ + + + + + + + + + + 
East Asian Ingest + + + + + + + + + + + 
New Books List + + + + + + + + (+) + (+) 
Chicano/Latino Serials + + + + + + (+) + - + - 
Vacation/Sick Leave 
Tracking 
+ + + + + + + + - + - 
Business/Reference 
Q&A's 
+ + + + + - - - - - - 
2000-2001 
Web Mail + + + + + + + + + + + 
Full Text DB Search + + + + + + - + + + - 
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Dental Journal ToC + + + + + + + + + + + 
Pathology Slides (+) + + + + (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) - 
Arch/F. Arts Slides (+) + + + + + - - - + - 
Velero Archive + + + + + + + + + + + 
2001-2002 
Dental Booklist + + + + + + + + + + + 
Velero Map + + + + + - - - - - - 
Collab. Service + + + + + - - - - + - 
eResources Query + + + + + + + + + + + 
Collab. Mgmt + + + + + + + + (+) + (+) 
Risk Tool (DART) + + + + + + - - (+) + + 
O-Tree eBASE + + + + (+) + (+) + (+) + + 
MBASE/BORE + + + + + (+) + + - + - 
QM/BORE + + + + + (+) + + - + - 
2002-2003 
Dia UML + + + + + + + + + + + 
Geotech Data + + + + + + + + + + + 
Leavey Sched. + + + + + (+) (+) (+) + (+) (+) 
QMIS + + + + + + + + + + + 
Caroline's Closet + + + + + + + + + + + 
MSCS-SE DB + + + + + + + (+) (+) + (+) 
CSE Tech Report + + + + + + + + (+) + (+) 
CRM Tool + + + + + + + + + + + 
Table 1 
 
The results shown in Table 1 suggest that: 
-all nine factors much be satisfied in order for total adoption. 
-partial adoption requires satisfaction of all but at most two factors, each of the latter 
of which must be at least partially satisfied. 
 
Table 1 shows clearly that if the client does not deem the project a success, the software will not 
be adopted. The converse, however, is not true. That is, the client’s deeming the project 
successful does not imply that it will be adopted. (In any case, client success is a project outcome 
rather than a “factor” in the pursuit of the project.). As a start on addressing the question of the 
relationship between the identified factors and software adoption,, we fit an ordinal logistic 
model to the data in Table 1 after assigning each factor a score of -1 if not addressed adequately, 
0 if addressed partially, and 1 if fully addressed. These sum of weights is used as the predictor 
and is correlated with an outcome value of -1 if not adopted, 0 if partially adopted, and 1 if fully 
adopted. Note that this sum represents the “degree of excess” of satisfied over unsatisfied factors. 
The questions of interest are: 
 
(Necessity): Is there a minimum sum required for adoption? 
(Sufficiency): Is there a sum over which the software is guaranteed to be adopted? 
(Criticality): How narrow is the threshold for adoption? 
 
Note that we assume that the factors are interchangeable with respect to software adoption and 
that satisfaction, partial satisfaction, and non-satisfaction are equally weighted. While these 
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assumptions may not be entirely reflective of the actual natures of the factors, they serve as a 
baseline for future refinements of this study. (Indeed, non-uniform weightings and exchanges can 
only serve to improve the predictive model.) 
 
Figure 1 shows the resulting models for software adoption and for client success; they fit the data 
remarkably well, with high confidence (R square value of 0.43 where random data has a value of 
less than 0.01 based on the 44 observations). Based on the Adoption Prediction model of Figure 
1, the identified factors are indeed “critical” in that there are very sharp thresholds between 
adoption and non-adoption. A project with a score of less than 8 has a 10% chance of non-
adoption. Just 3 points less and this jumps to 85%. Even with the maximum 9 points, the chance 
of full adoption is only 80%, which drops sharply to 20% at 7 points. Partial adoption is dicey at 


















R 2̂ = 0.4363
probability of client success














R 2̂ = 0.3275
 
Figure 1: Adoption Prediction      Figure 2: Client Success Prediction 
 
Figure 1 shows very clearly that the identified factors are critical for adoption in that the 
weighted sum of factors must go over a threshold value before adoption has more than a 
negligible probability. In terms of necessity, Figure 1 indicates that non-adoption is 
monotonically decreasing. Thus if there is an excess of at least 4 satisfied factors, non-adoption 
can be avoided (but only barely!) and adoption becomes more likely as the sum of factors 
increases. However, even though adoption increases monotonically after an excess of, there is no 
“sufficient” set of factors for adoption unless one is willing to accept an 80% chance of adoption 
with all 9 factors satisfied. Our interpretation of this result is that there are likely more factors we 
must consider. Indeed, for later studies, including the industry study discussed below, we have 
added 3 more factors which now seem to enable sufficiency (over 95% chance of adoption for 
successful projects).  
 
It must be noted that while the decreasing and increasing nature of the non-adoption and 
adoption curves is a mathematical feature of the logistic model, it is the fact that these curves are 
flat and non-flat at the ends which is a feature of the data itself. For example, if the data were 
random, these curves would be nearly linear throughout.  
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As to prediction of client satisfaction, consider Figure 2. It is clear that the factors are not 
necessary nor are they sufficient or critical. In fact, the “success” curve is really not that far from 
linear and is only “flat” very near the end. Nonetheless, if there is an excess of at least 4 satisfied 
factors over the likelihood of client satisfaction is over 85%. Thus for CS577 projects, it is 
relatively easy to achieve “client success.” We attribute this to the fact that university clients are 
often reluctant to criticize student projects for fear that criticism will result in low grades. 
Furthermore, university clients often deem their participation worthwhile even when they do not 
end up with the software they had originally hoped for —or with no working software at all. In 
fact, university clients often make comments such as “now I know more about what I really want 
and how difficult it will be to build” and “I now know that this idea isn’t really feasible.” (When 
student compassion is not a factor, however, client success is a strong predictor of both adoption 
and non-adoption as will be seen in the discussion, below, of software development projects in 
industry.) 
 
Introduction of scorecards in 1997-1998, with the attendant pre-vetting, by faculty, of potential 





1996-1997 0.08 No critical factors were used for vetting projects 
1997-1998 0.40 5 client-related critical factors were used to filter potential clients 
1998-1999 0.50 4 additional non client-related critical factors used to filter  
1999-2000 0.42 Smaller number of projects this year 
2000-2001 0.50  
2001-2002 0.50  
2002-2003 
0.72 




The weighted score is calculated by assigning 1 point for a partially adopted project, 2 points for 
an adopted project, and no points for a non-adopted project and then dividing by 2 times the 
number of projects (this is a weighted average favoring adopted projects). The more adopted and 
partially adopted projects the closer the score is to 1.  
 
3. Industry Study 
Encouraged by the university study, we embarked upon an industry study in 2002. For the 
industry study, three additional factors were introduced and the assessment of factor satisfaction 
was upgraded from informal conversations with clients and developers to the more formal 
approach of administering survey instruments to members of the client organizations. 
 
The new factors extend beyond just the client as a key stakeholder, to all key stakeholders. They 
are: 
10.Shared vision: A shared vision is deemed to exist if the following are created and 
maintained by all key stakeholders: 
-the (organizational) goals and objectives for the software product under 
development 
-the details of the project whereby the product is being developed  
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(A shared vision should include: the identity of the target customer, a 
statement of need or opportunity, and a compelling reason to develop or to 
buy/license and customize the product.) 
11.Business Case: A product’s/project’s business case is deemed to be satisfactory if 
it justifies the project based upon qualitative and quantitative analysis, both 
financial and other-than-financial: 
-The financial analysis may include: ROI estimates, NPV, break-even, 
payback, and projected profit and loss from investment 
-The other-than-financial analysis may include: quality improvements, 
response time improvements, ease of use improvements, and 
productivity improvements 
12.Win-Win Stakeholder agreement: A software development project is deemed to be 
driven by Win-Win stakeholder agreement if: 
-all critical stakeholders are identified at the start of the project 
-the initial shared vision is agreed to in such way as to maximize the 
number of critical stakeholders’ high priority win conditions that are met 
-any issues or conflicts that arise during the course of the project are 
resolved in such way as to maximize the number of critical stakeholders’ 
high priority win conditions that are met 
 
In the USC study, the researchers, CS577 faculty, were participants – on the order of department 
managers – in the development projects studied, so they had direct access to developers during 
the development process, and to clients both during and after development was finished.  
 
In the industry study, development projects were studied retrospectively, i.e., after their 
completion. Participants in the industry study were chosen randomly from the membership of the 
advisory board of the Department of Information Technology Management at the University of 
Hawaii at Manoa. The organizations they represent cover the following industries: banking, 
education, finance, healthcare, hospitality, tourism, and public utilities. The individuals involved 
included CIOs, MIS Managers, Directors of IT, Assistant Superintendents, and an application 
manager within an outsourced IT department. In each case, the industry participant was deemed 
the investigated project’s client because s/he was in charge of acquiring the software product in 
question and had a hand in determining the schedule, budget, and cost of the project. In all cases, 
the project/product studied was deemed, by the client, to have successfully produced the desired 
software.  
 
The research methodology chosen for the industry study was the use of survey instruments. Each 
of the twelve identified factors (see above) was represented by at least three survey questions. 
The following are examples: 
 
DOMAIN KNOWLEDGEABLE CLIENT 
1. The client was uncertain about one or more of the following aspects of the product:  
a. The rationale for the product 
b. The goals of the product 
c. The business processes that the product encompasses 
d. The impact of the product on the organization 
e. The necessary conditions for the product to provide value 
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2. The client was familiar with the existing OR expected user workflows needed to acquire or 
develop a software solution. 
3. The client was familiar with the business processes, policies, and user workflows of the 
existing system automated or manual. 
4. The client anticipated what changes in the business processes were feasible should the need 
arise in order to acquire or develop the software product. 
5. The client was familiar with the starting point for the project. 
e.g. the previous automated or manual system, the lack of a system, the resources available to 
build the system? 
 
As a safety check, one question for each factor is pitched on the negative side of the other 
questions. For example, see the first question (above) for Domain Knowledgeable Client. 
 
In all cases, clients responded to the survey questions in the context of an interview by one of the 
researchers; some interviews were conducted in-person, and others over the phone. In the first 
two interviews client responses were open-ended, with the result that it was difficult to get 
voluble respondents to come to the point. In the remaining interviews, respondents were given a 
choice of six options for each question: strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree, don’t 
know and not applicable. Questions were re-written, for clarity, as the interviews progressed, 
with the idea of refining them to the point at which a face-to-face interview would, eventually, 
not be necessary. 
 
Besides the problem of ambiguously-worded questions, a problem encountered in the 
development of any survey instrument, and one that we believe has been largely solved, the pilot 
industry study was subject to two additional problems:  
-complex organizational structure and the attendant difficulty of getting by with a 
single client 
-respondent error, accidental or not (the “halo” effect). 
 
The pilot study did not take into account the phenomenon of cross-functional structure. “Cross-
functional structure” means temporary teams, consisting of members of different units of the 
client organization, selected to bring knowledge of their specific areas of expertise to the project. 
In this type of structure there are lateral lines of communication which are not familiar in a 
strictly bureaucratic structure; while this type of structure has definite advantages, it creates 
multiple overlays of authority and influence. Authority is divided or shared among multiple 
project managers with the attendant problem, from the research project’s point of view, of 
selecting a representative client.  
 
In a cross-functional structure, the interpretation of questions like the following is problematic: 
 
-Did someone other than the client have control over whether or not the product was 
accepted?  
-Did s/he influence the decision to use it?  
 
In a cross-functional organization, the client would have to answer yes to both of these questions, 
because s/he did not have sole authority to mandate the use of the product. S/he may have fit our 
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definition of “client” because s/he was charged with acquiring the software and knew the 
situation that called for it, but thereafter s/he shared authority – or had no real authority -- for the 
duration of the development project. In this case, “representativeness” of the client is muddied. 
The following additional questions remain, in the case of cross-functional development, for the 
continuation of the research presented here: 
-Should “the client” consist of one member of each sub-team? 
-If so, how should the survey questions be posed? 
-and, of much greater interest, do cross-functional overlays of authority and influence 
pose a threat to software adoption.?  
 
An additional problem not encountered in the university study is the “halo effect.” In its simplest 
version the halo effect is when the client wants to re-interpret history to match the end results. 
For example, if the project was adopted, the client will say the project was a success and re-
interpret the project factors in a positive light regardless of the facts. If the project was not 
adopted, all the factors may be negatively colored in order to rationalize the non-adoption. In the 
pilot industry study this appeared to sometimes happen when the client was at the level of CIO. 
In a number of cases, when the CIO-level client had been too far from the day-to-day execution 
of the project under investigation, the researchers were referred to the project manager, who 
appeared fearful of divulging all relevant information lest it find its way back to his/her boss. 
Cross validation, with both negatively- and positively-phrased questions often suggests that this 
phenomenon is occurring. When it was detected, or when responses appeared to be less than 
completely consistent, respondents were phoned or emailed for clarification. Results of the 



















R 2̂ = 0.1650
















Figure 3a: Hawaii industry adoption prediction, Figure 3b: only “client success” projects 
 
Figure 2 shows the model of likelihood of client success given a sum of factors. This model 
indicates that the sum of factors is a better predictor of this than adoption. This to some extent 
reflects the aforementioned “halo effect” where the factors are biased towards the perceived 
outcome. Nonetheless it is remarkable how “critical” the sum of factors appears to be. To get a 
good chance of success there need be at least 7 more factors satisfied than unsatisfied. If there 
are more than 4 factors unsatisfied factors than satisfied, chances are the client will say the 
project was not a success. As indicated earlier, without the “student compassion” effect, client 
success has a strong correlation with both adoption and non-adoption. This can be seen by 
correlating the  
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Figure 4: Hawaii industry client success prediction 
 
In summary, results from the university study show that: 
-if ten or more of the factors are satisfied, then the software is adopted 
-if seven or fewer of the factors are satisfied, then the software is not adopted 
-there is no subsumption of factors, that is, any ten will do for adoption and lack of 
satisfaction of any seven results in non-adoption 
 
The industry results show considerably more play, with no clear threshold. Although the industry 
study is just a pilot study, and the application of the identified factors merits considerable 
additional study, our initial hypothesis regarding the difference is that: 
-CS577 projects have a hard deadline – the end of the academic year; if a CS577 
software product is not adopted at that point, there is little or no provision – no 
budget and no available developers – to tweak the software or the environment, 
however close to ready, in order to push the product over the nearly-accessible 
adoption threshold. 
-Industry projects can usually, though not always, be given a schedule or budget 
extension to turn an expensive failure into an only slightly more costly success. 
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